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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; 
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the 
rest of the country.
1
 
 
 Justice Brandeis’ statement is true, except where Congress has stood in that courageous 
state’s way and preempted state law via federal statute.2  A number of states have enacted 
statutes that provide protection to drug manufacturers in product liability actions.
3
  Additionally, 
several of these states have enacted “fraud-on-the-FDA” statutory provisions, which remove 
statutory protection afforded to drug manufacturers in product liability actions if plaintiffs can 
provide evidence that the drug manufacturer made misrepresentations to the United States Food 
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) during the process of obtaining marketing approval for the 
drug.
4
  Currently, the federal circuits are in disagreement over whether these state “fraud-on-the-
FDA” statutes should be federally preempted and thus invalidated.  The Sixth and Fifth circuits 
have held that Michigan’s and Texas’s fraud-on-the-FDA statutes, respectively, were federally 
preempted, while the Second Circuit found the same Michigan statute considered by the Sixth 
Circuit to be constitutional.
5
           
 This issue warrants resolution, and the Supreme Court did grant certiorari to hear the 
appeal of the Second Circuit’s decision in Desiano v. Warner–Lambert & Co.6  Unfortunately 
                                                 
*
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1
 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 286–87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
2
 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
3
 See infra notes 127–29 and accompanying text.  
4
 See infra note 130 and accompanying text.    
5
 Compare Garcia v. Wyeth Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961, 966 (6th Cir. 2004), and Lofton v. McNeil Consumer & 
Specialty Pharm., 672 F.3d 372, 380 (5th Cir. 2012), with Desiano v. Warner–Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 97 (2d 
Cir. 2006); see infra text accompanying note 156 (explaining the procedural history that led the Second Circuit ot 
consider a case involving Michigan state law). 
6
 Warner–Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S.Ct. 31 (2007). 
 3 
however, the Court issued a 4-4 decision without an opinion, which affirmed the Desiano 
holding, but has no precedential value.
7
  Thus, drug manufacturers, private citizens, and state 
legislatures have been left without a conclusive interpretation of the constitutionality of state 
fraud-on-the-FDA statutes.  Conflicts in interpretation are likely to continue until the Supreme 
Court resolves the issue.  
 This Comment proceeds as follows: Part II will discuss the history and role of the FDA’s 
authority in drug and medical device regulation; Part III will discuss federal preemption 
generally and the Supreme Court’s decisions that considered whether state law failure to warn 
claims are federally preempted in the context of drugs and medical devices; Part IV will discuss 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckman v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, where the Court held 
that claims that a medical device manufacturer made fraudulent representations to the FDA were 
federally preempted because such claims interfered with the relationship between the FDA and 
the entities it regulated
8
, state fraud-on-the-FDA statutory provisions, and the existing circuit 
split regarding whether those statutes should be federally preempted; Part V will discuss the 
potential resolutions to the circuit split; and Part VI will conclude and advocate that the Supreme 
Court’s Buckman holding be applied to federally preempt state fraud-on-the-FDA statutes 
because such statutes involve the relationship between a federal agency and the entity it regulates 
and thus undermine the FDA’s authority.   
II. FEDERAL DRUG AND DEVICE OVERSIGHT 
 A. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
 
 Historically, states have regulated matters of health and safety through their police 
                                                 
7
 Warner–Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S.Ct. 1168 (2008) (per curium); See Mark Hermann, et al. The Meaning of the 
Parallel Requirement Exception under Lohr and Riegel, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 545, 546 n. 12 (2010). 
8
 Buckman Co. v. Pls.’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 343  (2001). 
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powers.
9
  Since the Food and Drug Act of 1906 however, the federal government’s role in health 
and safety regulation has been expanding.
10
  In the Food and Drug Act of 1906 Congress 
prohibited the transport of adulterated or misbranded drugs in interstate commerce.
11
  In 1938, 
the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) was passed.12  The premarket approval process 
(“PMA”) for new drugs was implemented through the FDCA.13  The FDCA required drug 
manufacturers to submit new drug applications to the FDA, and the FDA conducted inter alia, 
safety and efficacy review.
14
  The FDA had the authority to reject a new drug application if the 
agency considered a drug to be “not safe as labeled.”15  In 1962, amendments to the FDCA 
required drug manufacturers, not the FDA, to provide evidence that a proposed drug was safe 
and effective as part of a New Drug Application (“NDA”), thus shifting the burden of proof from 
the FDA to the drug manufacturer.
16
   
If a drug manufacturer becomes aware of new safety information associated with a drug 
following the drug’s approval the FDCA requires that the drug’s warning label be appropriately 
revised to reflect that new information.
17
  In 2008, the FDA set forth a regulation that allows 
drug manufacturers to make some changes to a drugs label prior to obtaining FDA approval 
                                                 
9
 See Hillsborough County. v. Automated Med. Laboratories, 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985) (describing the “regulation 
of health and safety matters [as] primarily and historically a matter of local concern”) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985) (noting 
“[s]tates traditionally have had great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, 
limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.”) (quoting Butchers’ Benevolent Ass’n of New Orleans v. Crescent 
City Live–Stock Landing and Slaughter House Company (Slaughter House Cases) 83 U.S. 36, 62 (1872) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
10
See Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996).   
11
 PETER B. HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 10 (3d ed. 2007). 
12
 HUTT, supra note 11 at 13. 
13
 Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act 21 U.S.C. § 555 (2012).  
14
 Id. 
15
 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 567 (2009) (citing FDCA, 52 Stat. 1052 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 355 
(2012))). 
16
 Id. (citing FDCA, 76 Stat. 781, 784 (current version at Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012))). 
17
 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(o) (2012). 
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through the Changes Being Effected Process (“CBE”).18  Under the CBE process drug 
manufacturers can make changes to a brand name drug’s label for several reasons including 
adding or strengthening existing warnings or adverse reactions and adding or strengthening 
dosage or administration instructions to increase a drug’s safety.19  
 In 1976 the Medical Device Amendments (“MDA”) to the FDCA were passed.20  The 
MDA classifies medical devices based on risk into three categories.
21
  Each category is subject to 
regulation proportional to its perceived risk.
22
  Class I devices are subject to the least significant 
regulation of the three classes of devices.
23
  Class II devices are potentially more harmful and 
subject to more federal regulation than Class I devices.
24
  Class III devices are subject to the 
most significant federal regulation of the three classes of medical devices, and are defined as 
devices that are “purported or represented to be for a use in sustaining human life or for a use 
which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health, or presents a 
potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury.”25 
 To gain FDA approval, Class III devices must be approved either through the premarket 
approval (“PMA”) or § 510(k) processes.26  The PMA process is time consuming, and the FDA 
spends approximately 1,200 hours reviewing each application.
27
  Medical device manufacturers 
seeking approval of a device through the PMA process are required to provide comprehensive 
safety and efficacy data to the FDA.
28
  Approximately 1% of all medical devices entering the 
                                                 
18
 Wyeth, 555 U.S. 555, 568 (2009). 
19
 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A) (2008). 
20
 HUTT, supra note 11, at 14. 
21
 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 476. 
22
 Id. 
23
 Id. at 476–77 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A) (2012)). 
24
 Id. at 476 (citing U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (2012)). 
25
 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii)(I)–(II) (2012). 
26
 See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 477–78. 
27
 Id. at 477. 
28
 21 U.S.C. § 360e (2012); Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 477.  
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market do so through the PMA process.
29
   
 Class III medical devices can be approved through the § 510(k) process if a manufacturer 
demonstrates that the device is “substantially equivalent” to a previously approved medical 
device.
30
  A device is considered substantially equivalent if it has the same use and technological 
characters as a previously approved device or if the device has the same use, different 
technological characteristics, so long as the data submitted by the manufacturer does not indicate 
that the new device has additional safety and effectiveness concerns than a previously approved 
device.
31
  The § 510(k) process is less cumbersome than the PMA process, and § 510(k) 
clearance is completed by the FDA in approximately 20 hours.
32
  Approximately one third of all 
medical devices entering the market each year do so through the § 510(k) process, and the 
remaining 67% of medical devices entering the market each year without PMA or § 510(k) 
clearance do so without any review.
33
  
 In 1984 another significant change to the FDCA was made when Congress passed the Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (“Hatch-Waxman Amendments”).34  
Through the Hatch-Waxman Amendments manufacturers may obtain approval for generic drugs 
by submitting an abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”), which demonstrates that the 
generic drug is the same as another drug previously approved by the FDA.
35
  Through the 
ANDA process, generic drug manufacturers are required to submit a drug application that 
demonstrates the proposed drug’s label will be the same as a corresponding brand name drug’s 
                                                 
29
 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS 
AT 35 YEARS 4 (2011). 
30
 21 U.S.C. §§ 360(k), (o) (2012). 
31
 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (2012). 
32
 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 478. 
33
 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 28, at 4.  
34
 PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S.Ct. 2567, 2574 (2011).   
35
 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)).  
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label.
36
  In contrast, NDAs submitted by brand name drug manufacturers must demonstrate that 
the proposed drug’s label will contain accurate and sufficient warnings.37  Brand name drug 
manufacturers can modify the labels of drugs approved through the NDA or CBE processes, or 
by sending “Dear Doctor” letters which contain “additional warnings to prescribing physicians 
and other healthcare professionals” without first receiving approval from the FDA.38  Generic 
drug manufacturers cannot modify the labels of drugs approved through the ANDA process 
using the CBE process unless the modification is necessary to make the generic drug’s label 
match the corresponding brand name drug’s label.39   The Hatch-Waxman Amendments benefit 
generic drug manufacturers “[b]y eliminating the need for generic manufacturers to prove their 
drugs’ safety and efficacy independently[,]” thereby lowering the cost to obtain approval for 
generic drugs.
40
   
 B. The FDCA’s Preemption Provision 
 
 The effect of the FDCA on state laws involving drugs and medical devices has been 
significantly impacted by the statute’s preemption provision.41  The MDA include an express 
preemption provision relating to medical devices.
42
  The provision states in pertinent part: 
[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or 
political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect 
with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement – 
a) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement 
applicable under this chapter to the device, and b) which relates to 
the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter 
included in a requirement applicable to the device under this 
chapter.
43
   
                                                 
36
 PLIVA, 131 S.Ct. at 2574 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(G) (2012); and 21 
CFR §§ 314.94(a)(8), 314.127(a)(7) (2012)). 
37
 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(1), (d); Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 570–571). 
38
 Id. at 2576.  
39
 Id. at 2575. 
40
 Id. at 2574. 
41
 See infra Part III.B. 
42
 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012). 
43
 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012). 
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The FDCA does not include an express preemption provision relating to drugs.
 44
  As discussed 
in the next section, the Supreme Court has relied on Congress’s explicit inclusion of a 
preemption provision for medical devices but not for drugs within the FDCA’s text.45  
III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION  
 A. Supremacy Clause –Federal Preemption  
 
 The Supremacy Clause states “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”46  Under the 
Supremacy Clause if state laws “interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress . . . the 
act of Congress . . . is supreme; and the law of the State . . . must yield to it.”47  Both federal laws 
and federal regulations can preempt state laws.
48
  “Federal regulations have no less preemptive 
effect than federal statutes.”49      
 There are two general types of federal preemption: express and implied.
50
   Implied 
preemption is classified further into three subtypes – conflict, obstacle, and field preemption.51  
A federal law or regulation expressly preempts a state law if either the intent of Congress or a 
regulatory agency is “explicitly stated in the statute’s [or regulation’s] language.”52  A federal 
law or regulation preempts state law through implied conflict preemption if “compliance with 
                                                 
44
 See 21 U.S.C. § 360 (2012); see also Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 574. 
45
 See infra Part III.B. 
46
 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
47
 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824).  
48
 Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 713.    
49
 Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); See also United States v. Shimer 367 
U.S. 374, 381–82 (1961);  See also Capital Cities Cable, Inc., v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984). 
50
 See infra text accompanying notes 52–55.  
51
 See infra text accompanying notes 53–55. 
52
 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). 
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both federal and state regulations [or statutes] is a physical impossibility.”53  A federal law or 
regulation preempts state law through implied obstacle preemption if the federal legislation 
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”54  Finally, a federal law or regulation preempts state law through implied field 
preemption in circumstances where federal legislation occupies “a field in which the federal 
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state 
laws on the same subject.”55  
B. Preemption in the Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Context 
 
 Following the passage of the FDCA, the Supreme Court has considered the application of 
express preemption regarding medical devices approved via the 501(k) and PMA processes and 
implied preemption in the context of brand name and generic pharmaceuticals.  The body of case 
law that has developed has resulted in distinct holdings regarding federal preemption based upon 
industry and market entry method involved.
56
  The Court has held that state law failure to warn 
claims are preempted in cases involving medical devices entering the market through the PMA 
process and in cases involving generic pharmaceuticals.
57
  In contrast, state law failure to warn 
claims are not preempted in cases involving medical devices entering the market through the § 
510(k) process and cases involving brand name pharmaceuticals.
58
  
  i. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr  
 
 In Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, the Supreme Court considered “whether . . . [the MDA] pre-
empts a state law negligence action against the manufacturer of an allegedly defective medical 
                                                 
53
 Fla. Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963). 
54
 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
55
 Rice, 331 U.S. at 230. 
56
 See infra Figure 1. 
57
 See infra Parts III.B.ii and III.B.iv. 
58
 See infra Parts III.B.i and III.B.iii. 
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device approved through the 510(k) process.”59  In Medtronic, the plaintiff filed a claim against a 
medical device manufacturer, Medtronic, alleging negligence and strict products liability in 
Florida state court for injuries suffered as the result of the failure of a pacemaker.
60
   Medtronic 
removed the action to federal court and asserted that the plaintiff’s claims were expressly 
preempted by 21 U.S.C. § 360(k)(a).
61
  The Supreme Court was not persuaded by Medtronic’s 
argument and reasoned that because the medical device at issue was approved under the 510(k) 
process, which is “focused on equivalence, not safety,”62 the pacemaker had not “been formally 
reviewed under the MDA for safety or efficacy.”63  Thus, the statutory language and legislative 
history of the § 510(k) process “included the possibility that the manufacturer of the device 
would not have to defend itself against state-law claims of negligent design.”64  The Court 
reasoned that federal legislation should preempt state law “where a particular state requirement 
threatens to interfere with a specific federal interest.”65  Additionally, a state law must “relate to 
the safety and effectiveness of [a] device],” and be “different from or in addition to federal 
requirements” in order to be federally preempted.66  The Court reasoned that Florida could 
enforce common law duties that “parallel[ed] federal requirements.”67  Ultimately, the Court held 
that none of the plaintiff’s claims were preempted under § 360k.68   
  ii. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.  
 
 In Riegel v. Metronic, Inc., the Supreme Court considered whether the MDA’s preemption 
                                                 
59
 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 474.  
60
 Id. at 481. 
61
 Id.   
62
 Id. at 493 (quoting Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1348 (11th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
63
 Id.  
64
 Id. at 494. 
65
 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 500.  
66
 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
67
 Id. at 495.  
68
 Id. at 502. 
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clause, 21 U.S.C. § 360(k), expressly preempted state law claims that challenged the safety and 
efficacy of medical devices approved through the PMA process.
69
  In Riegel, the plaintiff 
claimed that he was injured because the Evergreen Balloon Catheter, manufactured by Medtronic 
and approved by the FDA through the PMA process, was “designed, labeled, and manufactured” 
in a manner that violated New York State law.
70
   
 The Court distinguished the PMA process from the § 510(k) process because the PMA 
process is focused on the safety and effectiveness, while the § 510(k) process is focused on 
medical device equivalence.
71
  The Court specifically noted that PMA “is specific to individual 
devices . . . and it is federal safety review.”72  Thus, if a state law imposed requirements that 
were “different from or in addition to federal requirements and . . . relate[d] to the safety or 
effectiveness of the device,” such state laws would be expressly federally preempted by § 
360(k).
73
  The Court held that because the New York common law claims at issue related to the 
safety and effectiveness of the Evergreen Balloon Catheter, and imposed requirements that were 
different from those required under the PMA process, those claims were expressly federally 
preempted.
74
  
 The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Lohr and Riegel demonstrates that the federal 
requirements of a medical device’s market entry determine whether or not state law claims 
alleging that a device is unsafe survive a federal preemption challenge.  If a medical device is 
approved through the PMA process any state law claims challenging the device’s safety are 
expressly preempted by the FDCA.
75
  However, if a medical device is cleared through the § 
                                                 
69
 Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312, 315 (2008).  
70
 Id. at 320. 
71
 Id. at 322–23. 
72
 Id. at 323. 
73
 Id. 
74
 Id. at 330. 
75
 See supra Part III.B.ii. 
 12 
510(k) process, so long as a state law claim is parallel to the FDCA’s requirements, such claims 
are not federally preempted.
76
  In considering federal preemption in the context of state law 
failure to warn claims involving brand name and generic pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning has similarly been tied to the specific statutory language of the FDCA.
77
   
  iii. Wyeth v. Levine  
 
 In Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court considered “[w]hether the FDA’s drug labeling 
requirements preempt state law product liability claims premised on the theory that different 
labeling judgments were necessary to make drugs reasonably safe for use.”78  In Wyeth, the 
plaintiff was injured after receiving a Phenergan injection.
79
  Phenergan is an antihistamine drug 
approved through the NDA process.
80
  The plaintiff asserted a products liability claim and a 
negligence claim against Wyeth alleging that the manufacturer failed to adequately provide 
warnings on Phenergan’s label regarding drug administration risks.81  Wyeth argued that the 
plaintiff’s claims were federally preempted through both implied conflict preemption and 
implied obstacle preemption.
82
   
 Wyeth maintained that the plaintiffs’ state law claims were preempted through implied 
conflict preemption “because it [was] impossible for it to comply with both the state-law duties 
underlying those claims and its federal labeling duties.”83  Specifically, Wyeth noted that it could 
not modify Phenergan’s label to comply with state law without first obtaining FDA approval 
under the FDCA.
84
  The Court reasoned that while generally modifications to labels for drugs 
                                                 
76
 See supra Part III.B.i. 
77
 See infra Parts III.B.iii and III.B.iv. 
78
 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 563. 
79
 Id. at 560. 
80
 Id. at 555. 
81
 Id. at 559–60. 
82
 Id. at 563. 
83
 Id. at 568 (citing de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153). 
84
 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 568.  
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approved through the NDA process required approval from the FDA before the label was altered, 
under certain circumstances a drug manufacturer could modify a drug’s label before obtaining 
FDA approval.
85
  The FDA’s CBE process allows modifications to drug labels after a 
supplemental application has been filed with the FDA, but prior to the manufacturer receiving 
FDA approval for the changes, if the modifications “add or strengthen a contraindication, 
warning, precaution, or adverse reaction,” or if the modifications “add or strengthen an 
instruction about dosage and administration that is intended to increase the safe use of the 
drug.”86  The Court reasoned that the plaintiff’s claims were not preempted through implied 
conflict preemption because Wyeth could comply with both federal and state laws.”87       
 Wyeth argued that Levine’s state law claims were preempted through implied obstacle 
preemption because the claims “interfere[d] with Congress’s purpose to entrust an expert agency 
to make drug labeling decisions.”88  The Court reasoned that the lack of an express preemption 
provision for drugs approved through the NDA process in the FDCA was an indication that 
Congress did not believe such state law claims “posed an obstacle to its objectives.”89  Wyeth’s 
implied obstacle preemption argument relied on the text of the FDA’s 2006 preamble in which 
the FDA maintained that the FDCA preempted state laws related to pharmaceutical labeling.
90
  
The Court reasoned that the 2006 preamble did “not merit deference” because the FDA 
published the preamble without first “offering States and other interested parties notice or 
opportunity for comment.”91  Additionally, the Court noted that the 2006 preamble conflicted 
                                                 
85
 Id.  
86
 Id.  (quoting 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.70(c)(6)(iii) (A), (C) (2012)).   
87
 Id. at 573. 
88
 Id. (“requiring…[Wyeth]…to comply with state–law duty to provide a stronger warning about IV–push 
administration would obstruct the purpose and objectives of federal drug labeling regulation”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
89
 Id. at 574. 
90
 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 573–74. 
91
 Id. at 577. 
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with the FDA’s previous position that state law served as an additional method to regulate the 
pharmaceutical industry.
92
  Thus, the Court concluded that the plaintiff’s state law claims were 
not preempted through implied conflict or implied obstacle preemption.
93
 
  iv. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing  
 
 In PLIVA v. Mensing, the Supreme Court considered “whether, and to what extent generic 
[drug] manufacturers may change their labels after FDA approval.”94  In PLIVA, the plaintiffs 
claimed that they developed neurological disorders after taking metoclopramide, a generic drug 
approved through the ANDA process, and that their injuries were caused by metoclopramide’s 
manufacturers failure to “provide adequate warning labels.”95  The metoclopramide 
manufacturers argued that the plaintiffs’ claims were federally preempted through implied 
conflict preemption.
96
   
 Under the state laws applicable to the plaintiffs’ claims, drug manufacturers are required to 
provide labels that render a drug “reasonably safe.”97  The Supreme Court reasoned that the state 
laws requiring all drug manufacturers, including those of generic drugs, to modify their drug 
labels to make those labels safer conflicted directly with generic drug manufacturer’s federal 
obligations to ensure that generic drug label are the same as the labels on corresponding brand-
name drugs.
98
  Therefore, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ state law claims were federally 
preempted via implied conflict preemption.
99
  
 Thus, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Wyeth and PLIVA indicates that based on the 
language of the FDCA individuals may assert failure to warn claims against brand name 
                                                 
92
 Id. at 577–78. 
93
 Id. at 581. 
94
 PLIVA, 131 S.Ct. at 2574.   
95
 Id. at 2572. 
96
 Id. at 2573. 
97
 Id. at 2570. 
98
 Id. at 2578. 
99
 Id. at 2581. 
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pharmaceutical manufacturers, but may not assert the same claim against generic drug 
manufacturers.
100
  In his concurrence to the PLIVA opinion, Justice Thomas noted, “Congress 
and the FDA retain the authority to change the law and regulations if they so desire.”101  
Subsequent to the Court’s PLIVA opinion, identical bills were introduced in both the United 
States Senate and the United States House of Representatives on April 18, 2012 that would allow 
generic drug manufacturers to modify drug labels using the CBE process by adding “the holder 
of an approved application under this subsection [(ANDA)] may change the labeling of a drug so 
approved in the same manner authorized by regulation for the holder of an approved new drug 
application under subsection (b)” and “[i]n the event of a labeling change made under 
subparagraph (A), the Secretary may order conforming changes to the labeling of the equivalent 
listed drug and each drug approved under this subsection that corresponds to such listed drug” to 
21 U.S.C. § 355(j).
102
  If passed, either bill would allow generic drug manufacturers to change 
the warning labels on drugs through the same CBE process currently applicable to brand name 
drug manufacturers.
103
  Additionally, either bill’s passage would overrule the Court’s holding in 
PLIVA by allowing individuals to assert state law failure to warn claims against both brand name 
and generic pharmaceutical manufactures who failed to sufficiently update drug safety labels.  
Figure 1 below summarizes the Supreme Court’s preemption precedent in state law failure to 
warn cases involving drugs and medical devices.   
 
 
 
                                                 
100
 See supra Parts III.B.iii and III.B.iv. 
101
 PLIVA, 131 S.Ct. at 2582 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
102
 Patient Safety and Generic Labeling Improvement Act, S. 2295, 112 Cong. (2nd Sess. 2012) (as referred to 
Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions); Patient Safety and Drug Labeling Improvement Act, H.R. 4384, 112 
Cong. (2nd Sess. 2012) (as referred to House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Apr. 18, 2012) (as referred to 
Subcomm. on Health, Apr. 20, 2012). 
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Figure 1:  Supreme Court Federal Preemption Precedent Regarding Failure to Warn  
Case 
Industry/Market 
Entry 
Express/Implied 
Preemption 
Outcome 
Medtronic, Inc. 
v. Lohr 
Medical Device/§ 
510(k) 
Express 
No Preemption – where state 
law claims parallel federal 
requirements 
Riegel v. 
Medtronic, Inc. 
Medical Device/PMA Express Express Preemption 
Wyeth v. Levine 
Brand Name 
Pharmaceutical/NDA 
Implied 
No Obstacle or Conflict 
Preemption 
PLIVA, Inc. v. 
Mensing 
Generic 
Pharmaceutical/ANDA 
Implied Conflict Preemption 
 
IV.  FEDERAL PREEMPTION – FRAUD ON THE FDA CAUSES OF ACTION AND STATE STATUTES  
In addition to considering state failure to warn claims in the drug and medical device 
context, the Supreme Court has additionally considered whether another distinct cause of action 
was preempted in the medical devices context.  In Buckman, the Supreme Court addressed 
whether “fraud-on-the-FDA” claims were preempted by the FDCA.104  The following section 
describes the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Buckman, current state fraud-on-the-FDA statutes 
that exist to provide liability protection to pharmaceutical companies in failure to warn cases, 
and the current circuit split that exists over whether the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Buckman 
should be extended to federally preempt these statutory provisions.  
A. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff’s Legal Committee   
  
In Buckman, the plaintiffs filed a claim alleging a violation of state tort law against a 
consulting company affiliated with the manufacturer of orthopedic bone screws, which were 
classified as Class III medical devices that had been approved through the § 510(k) process.
105
  
Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant, “made fraudulent representations to the . . . 
FDA . . . in the course of obtaining approval to market the screws.”106  Additionally, the 
                                                 
104
 Buckman, 531 U.S. at 343.    
105
 Id. at 343, 346 (quoting In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 159 F.3d 817, 820 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
106
 Id. at 343. 
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plaintiffs claimed that the fraudulent representations caused their alleged injuries.
107
  Thus, 
“[h]ad the representations not been made, the FDA would not have approved the devices, and the 
plaintiffs would not have been injured.”108  The Court considered whether the plaintiffs’ fraud-
on-the-FDA claims were preempted by the FDCA.
109
 
The Supreme Court reasoned that the “presumption against preemption”110 that generally 
arises in cases dealing with matters of health and safety did not exist in Buckman because the 
claim’s asserted . . . “involved the relationship between a federal agency and the entity it 
regulates.”111  Such relationships are “inherently federal in character because the relationship 
originates from, is governed by, and terminates according to federal law.”112  The Court noted 
that “the federal statutory scheme amply empowers the FDA to punish and deter fraud against 
the . . . [FDA,] . . .  and this authority is used by the . . . [FDA] to achieve a somewhat delicate 
balance of statutory objectives.”113  As a result of this federal scheme and the FDA’s authority, 
the “balance sought by the . . . [FDA] . . . can be skewed by allowing fraud-on-the-FDA claims 
under state tort law.”114  
The Court noted that allowing state fraud-on-the-FDA claims would “dramatically 
increase the burdens facing potential applicants,” who would be subject to liability under both 
the FDCA and each individual state’s laws.115  As a result of allowing such claims, potential 
“applicants may be discouraged from seeking § 510(k) approval116 of devices with potentially 
                                                 
107
 Id. 
108
 Id. 
109
 Id.  
110
 Buckman, 531 U.S. at 348. 
111
 Id. at 347. 
112
 Id.  
113
 Id. at 348. 
114
 Id.  
115
 Id. at 350. 
116
 But see Joyce B. Margarce & Michelle R. Schieffele, “Is the Preemption Defense for PMA-Approved Medical 
Devices in Jeopardy?”75 DEF. COUNS. J. 12, 15 (2008) (noting that while the PMA process indicates that a medical 
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beneficial off-label uses for fear that such use might expose the manufacturer . . . to 
unpredictable civil liability.”117  The Court also expressed concern that, should state law fraud-
on-the-FDA claims be allowed, it could result in applicants submitting a “deluge of information” 
to the FDA because of “fear that their disclosures to the FDA, although deemed appropriate by 
the . . . [FDA could] . . . later be judged insufficient in state court.”118  The § 510(k) process 
could be slowed as a result of the increased information.
119
 
Additionally, the Court distinguished the claims at issue in Buckman from the claims 
addressed in Medtronic because in Buckman the claims “exist[ed] solely by virtue of the FDCA 
disclosure requirements,” while the claims in Medtronic “arose from the manufacturer’s alleged 
failure to use reasonable care in the production of the product, not solely from the violation of 
FDCA requirements.”120  The Court held that “[s]tate-fraud-on-the-FDA claims inevitably 
conflict with the FDA’s responsibility to police fraud consistently with the Administration’s 
judgment and objectives,” and therefore the plaintiff’s claims were preempted through implied 
conflict preemption.
121
 
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Thomas, reasoned that if the FDA 
had determined prior to the litigation that the drug manufacturer had committed fraud during the 
course of gaining approval for the device, and the FDA had begun the process of removing the 
device from the market, the plaintiff’s claim would not have been preempted.122  Justice Stevens 
reasoned further that preemption would not prohibit the plaintiffs’ claim because the “claim 
would not depend upon speculation as to the FDA’s behavior in a counterfactual situation but 
                                                                                                                                                             
device has been approved by the FDA, the § 510(k) process is a clearance process not an approval process). 
117
 Buckman, 531 U.S. at 350. 
118
 Id. at 351. 
119
 Id. 
120
 Id. at 353. 
121
 Id. at 348, 350.    
122
 Id. at 354 (Stevens, J., concurring).   
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would be grounded in the agency’s explicit actions.”123  If the FDA determined that fraud had 
been committed in the course of the approval process, “a plaintiff would be able to establish 
causation without second-guessing the FDA’s decision-making or overburdening its personnel, 
thereby alleviating the Government’s central concerns regarding fraud-on-the-agency claims.”124  
Under those circumstances, “state damages remedies would not encroach upon, but rather would 
supplement and facilitate the federal enforcement statute.”125  Figure 2 below, summarizes 
Supreme Court drug and medical device precedent, while specifically distinguishing the claim at 
issue in Buckman from the state failure to warn claims previously considered by the Court in the 
context of drug and medical devices.  
Figure 2:  Supreme Court Federal Preemption Precedent  
Case 
Industry/Market 
Entry 
Claim 
Express/Implied 
Preemption 
Outcome 
Medtronic, 
Inc. v. Lohr 
Medical Device/§ 
510(k) 
 
 
 
Express 
No Preemption – 
where state law 
claims parallel 
federal requirements 
Riegel v. 
Medtronic, 
Inc. 
Medical Device/PMA 
Failure to 
warn 
Express Express Preemption 
Wyeth v. 
Levine 
Brand Name 
Pharmaceutical/ NDA 
 Implied 
No Obstacle or 
Conflict Preemption 
PLIVA, Inc. v. 
Mensing 
Generic 
Pharmaceutical/ANDA 
 Implied Conflict Preemption 
Buckman v. 
Plaintiffs’ 
Legal 
Committee 
Medical Device/§ 
510(k) 
Fraud-on-
the-FDA 
Implied Conflict Preemption 
 
 B. State Law Fraud-on-the-FDA Statutes 
 
 A number of states have passed legislation that provides different types of liability 
protection for drug manufacturers in state tort law cases, so long as the drug manufacturer 
                                                 
123
 Buckman, 531 U.S. at 354 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
124
 Id.  (Stevens, J., concurring).   
125
 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).   
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involved in the litigation followed the FDCA’s requirements to obtain approval to market the 
drug.
126
  In Michigan, drug manufacturers are never liable in product liability suits, provided the 
manufacturer met all FDCA requirements.
127
  In some states, drug manufacturers are afforded a 
rebuttable presumption against liability in tort cases if a drug was approved according to FDA 
standards.
128
  In some states, drug manufacturers are not liable for punitive damages in product 
liability cases so long as the manufacturer adhered to the FDCA’s requirements.129  Yet, in other 
states, liability protection for drug manufacturers is removed if a plaintiff can provide evidence 
that the manufacturer made misrepresentations to the FDA in the course of gaining approval for 
the drug involved in the litigation.
130
  
A disagreement currently exists among the federal circuits regarding whether the 
provisions of those statutes that remove liability protection when a plaintiff can provide evidence 
that a pharmaceutical company made misrepresentations to the FDA during the application 
process should be federally preempted.
131
  Case law in the lower federal courts, as well as state 
courts, continues to emerge on both sides of the preemption issue regarding whether these 
“fraud-on-the-FDA” statutory provisions should be federally preempted by the FDCA.132  Thus 
                                                 
126
 See infra notes 127–30. 
127
 MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 600.2946(5) (1995). 
128
 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(2) (1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60–3304(a) (1981);  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C–4 
(West 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13–21–403(1)(b) (2003);  TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.007(a) 
(2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29–28–104(a) (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B–6–703 (West 2008). 
129
 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C–5(c) (West 1987);  OR. REV. STAT. § 30.927(1) (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2307.80(C)(1)(1988); ARIZ. REV. STA. ANN. § 12–701(a) (1989);  UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B–8–203(1) (2008); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 32–03.2–11(6) (2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13–64–302.5(5)(a) (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29–39–
104(d)(1) (2012). 
130
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C–5(c) (West 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(C)(2)(1988); ARIZ. REV. STA. 
ANN. § 12–701(b) (1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 600.2946(5)(a)–(b) (1995); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 
ANN. § 82.007(b) (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B–6–703(2) (West 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32–03.2–11(7) 
(2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29–39–104(d)(2) (2012).  
131
 See supra note 5.  
132
 See Zimmerman v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. RWT 08cv2089, 2012 WL 3848545, at *16 (D. Md. Sept. 5, 
2012) (holding that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C–5(c) was federally preempted); see also Murthy v. Abbott Labs., 847 
F.Supp.2d 958 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (holding that TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.007(b) was federally 
preempted); see also Forman v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 793 F.Supp.2d 598, 599 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that N.J. 
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far, three Circuit Courts of Appeal have considered the issue.
133
  The Second and Sixth Circuits 
created a split regarding the issue of preemption of Michigan’s “fraud-on-the-FDA” statutory 
provision exception.
134
  The split was deepened this year when the Fifth Circuit considered a 
similar provision of a Texas statute and held that it was preempted by the FDCA.
135
  Unless and 
until the Supreme Court issues an opinion on the issue, increased litigation and disagreement 
among the circuits regarding the proper interpretation of these statutes is likely. 
  i. Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories: Sixth Circuit Finds Federal Preemption 
 
 In Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, the Sixth Circuit considered whether MICH. 
COMP. LAWS. §§ 600.29469(5)(a) or (b) were federally preempted, and if so, whether the 
“preemption . . . require[d] . . . [the court] . . . to invalidate § 600.29469(5) in its entirety”136 or if 
the preempted portions of the statute were severable from the remainder of the statute.
137
  The 
Michigan statute considered by the Sixth Circuit states in pertinent part:  
In a product liability action against a manufacturer or seller, a 
product that is a drug is not defective or unreasonably dangerous, 
and the manufacturer or seller is not liable, if the drug was 
approved for safety and efficacy by the United States [F]ood and 
[D]rug [A]dministration’s approval at the time the drug left the 
control of the manufacturer or seller.
138
   
 
 The immunity afforded to drug manufacturers under § 600.29469(5) is subject to several 
                                                                                                                                                             
Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C–5(c) was not federally preempted); see also Yocham v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 736 F.Supp.2d 
875, 889 (D.N.J. 2010) (holding TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.007(b) was not federally preempted);  
see also Henderson v.  Merck & Co., No. 04–CV–05987–LDD, 2005 WL 2600220 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2005) 
(holding that MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 600.2946(5)(a)–(b) were federally preempted); see also Kobar v. 
Novartis Corp., 378 F.Supp.2d 1166, 1177 (D. Ariz 2005) (holding that ARIZ. REV. STA. ANN. § 12–701(b) was 
federally preempted); see also McDarby v. Merck & Co., 401 N.J.Super 10, 99 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) 
(holding that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C–5(c) was federally preempted). 
133
 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
134
 Compare Garcia, 385 F.3d at 966, with Desiano, 467 F.3d at 97. 
135
 Lofton, 672 F.3d at 380. 
136
 Garcia, 385 F.3d at 966. 
137
 Id. at 963.   
138
 MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 600.2946(5) (1995). 
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exceptions.
139
  Drug manufacturers are not provided immunity if a plaintiff can provide evidence 
that a defendant drug manufacturer:  
Intentionally [witheld] from or misrepresent[ed] to the United 
States [F]ood and [D]rug [A]dministration information concerning 
the drug that is required to be submitted under the federal [F]ood, 
[D]rug, and [C]osmetic act . . . and the drug would not have been 
approved, or the [FDA] . . . would have withdrawn approval for the 
drug if the information was accurately submitted.
140
 
 
Additionally, drug manufacturers are not provided immunity under § 600.29469(5)(a) if a 
plaintiff can provide evidence that in the process of obtaining FDA approval to market a drug, 
the defendant drug manufacturer made “an illegal payment to an official or employee of the . . . 
[FDA] . . . for the purpose of securing or maintaining approval of the drug.”141 
 In Garcia, the plaintiff filed a state tort law claim in federal court against the manufacturer 
of the prescription drug Duract.
142
  The plaintiff alleged that Duract’s manufacturer had 
manufactured and sold an unsafe drug, and that the manufacture and sale of the drug caused the 
plaintiff to suffer from liver failure and require liver transplant.
143
  The plaintiff “argued . . . that 
Section 600.2945(5) conflicts and is impliedly preempted by federal law because it requires one 
to prove fraud on the FDA as part of her cause of action against the Defendant.”144  The district 
court agreed with the plaintiff that § 600.2945(5) was preempted by federal law, but also held 
that the preempted portion of the statute could be severed from the remainder of the Michigan 
statute, thereby maintaining the drug manufacturer’s statutory immunity.145  
 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court’s reasoning that “in analyzing 
implied preemption, a court must begin with the assumption that a state law is valid and should 
                                                 
139
 See MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN.  § 600.2946(5)(a), (b) (1995). 
140
 MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 600.2946(5)(a) (1995).  
141
 MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 600.2946(5)(b) (1995). 
142
 Garcia, 385 F.3d at 963. 
143
 Id. 
144
 Id. at 965. 
145
 Id.  
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be reluctant to resort to the Supremacy Clause.”146  The Sixth Circuit noted that in Buckman the 
Supreme Court held that “[s]tate law fraud-on-the-FDA claims inevitably conflict with the 
FDA’s responsibility to police fraud consistently with the Agency’s judgment and objectives.”147  
The Sixth Circuit asserted that the plaintiff’s claim in Garcia differed from the claim considered 
in Buckman because § 600.29469(5) was not a specific cause of action alleging fraud-on-the –
FDA.  Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit found this difference “immaterial” and agreed with the 
district court’s reasoning that “Buckman teaches that state tort remedies requiring proof of fraud 
committed against the FDA are foreclosed since federal law preempts such claims.”148   
 The Sixth Circuit opined further however, that “it makes abundant sense to allow a State 
that chooses to incorporate a federal standard into its law of torts to allow that standard to apply 
when the federal agency itself determines fraud marred the regulatory-approval process.”149  
Thus, the Sixth Circuit held that § 600.29469(5)(a) and (b) are impliedly federally preempted 
unless the plaintiff can provide evidence that the FDA itself has found that a drug manufacturer 
engaged in bribery or fraud-on-the-FDA in the course of obtaining approval for a drug.”150   
 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit held that while §§ 600.2946(5)(a) and (b) are federally 
preempted under certain circumstances, these portions of Michigan’s statute were severable from 
the remainder of § 600.2946(5).
151
  Consequently, if a court holds that a portion of a statute is 
unconstitutional it can be severable from the rest of the statute “unless such construction would 
be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature.”152  The Sixth Circuit reasoned that “it 
                                                 
146
 Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
147
 Id. (quoting Buckman, 531 U.S. at 350) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
148
 Garcia, 385 F.3d at 965 (quoting Garcia v. Wyeth–Ayerst Labs, 265 F.Supp.2d 825 (E.D. Mich. 2003)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
149
 Id. at 966 (emphasis added). 
150
 Id.  
151
 Id. 
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 Id. (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 8.5 (2012)) (“If any portion of an act . . . shall be found to be invalid by 
a court, such invalidity shall not affect the remaining portions . . . of the act.”). 
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appears that the Michigan legislature was concerned that unlimited liability for drug 
manufacturers would threaten the viability of many enterprises and could add substantially to the 
cost and unavailability of many drugs.”153  Additionally, “severing the preemption exceptions . . . 
[would] . . . not give license to drug manufacturers to use bribery or fraud as a means of 
obtaining FDA approval . . . [but] . . . would merely place responsibility for prosecuting bribery 
or fraud on the FDA in the hands of the Federal Government rather than the state courts.”154  The 
Sixth Circuit has since affirmed its holding in Garcia.
155
   
  ii. Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co.:  Second Circuit Finds No Federal Preemption 
 
 In Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., the Second Circuit considered whether MICH. COMP. 
LAWS. § 600.29469(5)(a) was federally preempted.
156
  The plaintiffs in Desiano were Michigan 
residents who filed claims against the manufacturers of the type-2 diabetes drug, Resulin, in 
Michigan and California state courts.
157
  The plaintiffs filed a number of claims including breach 
of warranty, negligence, and fraud.
158
   The defendants, Resulin manufacturers, removed the 
cases to federal court and the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the claims 
and transferred them to the Southern District of New York.
159
  At the district court level the 
defendant’s filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and argued that they were not liable 
under § 600.29469(5).
160
  The district court held that § 600.29469(5)(a) was impliedly federally 
preempted and should be severed from the remainder of § 600.29469(5), “except where the 
plaintiff relies on a finding by the FDA, or in an action brought by the FDA, of material fraud in 
                                                 
153
 Id. at 967 (citing State Fiscal Agency, Revised Bill Analysis, S.B. 344 & H.B. 4508 (Mich. 1996)). 
154
 Garcia, 385 F.3d at 967. 
155
 See Marsh v. Genentech Inc., Nos. 11–2373, 11–2385, 11–2419, 11–2417, 2012 WL 3854780 (6th Cir. Sept. 6, 
2012); See also, In re Aredia & Zometa Prods. Liab. Litig., 352 F. App’x 994 (6th Cir. 2009). 
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 Desiano, 467 F.3d at 87. 
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 Id. at 88. 
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159
 Id. 
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the new drug approval process absent which approval would not have been granted.”161     
 On appeal, the Second Circuit reasoned that the plaintiff’s claim in Desiano differed from 
the claim asserted in Buckman in three ways.
162
  First, a presumption against federal preemption 
that did not exist in Buckman existed in Desiano.  The court noted that the Supreme Court has 
previously described that, “because the states are independent sovereigns in our federal system, . 
. . Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.”163  In Buckman, the 
presumption against preemption did not exist because the claim being asserted involved the 
relationship between a federal agency and the entity that agency regulated, which the Court 
posited was not an area historically controlled by state law.
164
  In Desiano, the Second Circuit 
asserted that the claim could not “reasonably be characterized as a state’s attempt to police fraud 
against the FDA.”165  The Second Circuit reasoned that because the plaintiff’s claim involved the 
“Michigan state legislature’s desire to rein in state-based tort liability” it fell “squarely within . . . 
its [the legislature’s] . . . prerogative to regulate matters of health and safety” and the 
presumption against preemption applied.
166
 
 Second, the Second Circuit noted that the claims asserted in Desiano were based on state 
tort law in contrast to the fraud-on-the-FDA claims asserted in Buckman.
167
  The claims asserted 
in Desiano and Buckman were based on two distinct sets of duties.
168
  The claims in Desiano 
were based on “duties between a product manufacturer and a Michigan consumer,” while the 
claims asserted in Buckman were based on “a duty between a manufacturer and a federal 
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 Id. at 88–89. 
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 Desiano, 467 F.3d. at 93. 
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 Id. (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485.) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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agency.”169  The Second Circuit opined that finding the plaintiff’s claims preempted in Desiano 
would mean that “Congress . . . modified traditional state tort law duties between pharmaceutical 
companies and their consumers.”170  Additionally, the Second Circuit noted that in Buckman 
proving “fraud against the FDA [was] alone sufficient to impose liability.”171  Desiano was 
distinguishable, as Medtronic was from Buckman, because the plaintiff’s complaints (in Desiano 
and Medtronic) “allege[d] a wide range of putative common law duties long-recognized by 
Michigan’s tort regime,” and those claims were not “based solely on the wrong of defrauding the 
FDA,” as the claims in Buckman were.172  
 Finally, the Second Circuit noted that “unlike Buckman . . . proof of fraud against the FDA 
is not even an element of a products liability claim” asserted by the plaintiffs in Desiano.173  In 
Desiano, “properly-obtained FDA approval becomes germane only if a defendant company 
chooses to assert an affirmative defense made available by the Michigan legislature.”174  The 
Second Circuit reasoned that finding preemption in Desiano would “result in preemption of a 
scope that would go far beyond anything that has been applied in the past.”175   
 The Second Circuit concluded that § 600.29469(5)(a) was not federally preempted because 
the claim did not implicate the presumption against preemption, the Michigan statute did not 
“implicate the concerns” discussed in Buckman, and the plaintiff’s claim involved traditional tort 
law.
176
 
  iii. Lofton v. McNeil Consumer & Specialty Pharmaceuticals: Fifth Circuit Finds Federal 
Preemption 
 
                                                 
169
 Id.  
170
 Id. at 95. 
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 Id. at 96. 
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 Desiano, 467 F.3d at 96.  
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 Recently, the Fifth Circuit deepened the circuit split created by the Second Circuit’s 
Desiano decision.   In Lofton v. McNeil Consumer & Specialty Pharmaceuticals, the Fifth 
Circuit considered whether TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.007(b)(1) was federally 
preempted.
177
   The Texas statute considered by the Fifth Circuit states in pertinent part: 
In a product liability action alleging that an injury was caused by a 
failure to provide adequate warnings or information with regard to 
a pharmaceutical product, there is a rebuttable presumption that 
the defendant or defendants, including a health care provider, 
manufacturer, distributor, and prescriber, are not liable with 
respect to the allegations involving failure to provide adequate 
warnings or information if: the warnings or information that 
accompanied the product in its distribution were those approved by 
the United States Food and Drug Administration for a product 
approved under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act…or the 
warnings provided were those stated in monographs developed by 
the United States Food and Drug Administration for 
pharmaceutical products that may be distributed without an 
approved new drug application.
178
   
 
 A plaintiff may rebut the presumption inter alia by “establishing that the defendant . . . 
withheld from or misrepresented to the [FDA] required information that was material and 
relevant to the performance of the product and was causally related to the claimants injury.”179 
 In Lofton, the plaintiffs filed negligence and products liability claims against McNeil 
Consumer and Specialty Pharmaceuticals (“McNeil”), the manufacturer of Motrin.180  The 
claims alleged that McNeil “had failed to warn consumers about the risk of . . . severe 
autoimmune allergic reactions” associated with Motrin.181  McNeil raised § 82.007(a)(1) as an 
affirmative defense because in obtaining FDA approval for Motrin it had “complied with all 
                                                 
177
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FDA requirements governing the labels of over-the-counter ibuprofen.”182  The district court 
concluded that “§ 82.007(b)(1), which allows plaintiffs to attempt to rebut the presumption 
established by § 82.007(a)(1), was federally preempted . . . including . . . where Plaintiffs ask the 
court to reach the conclusion opposite of that reached by the FDA, that the Defendant did not 
withhold information or mislead it.”183 
   On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that it needed to determine whether the claim at issue 
was more analogous to Wyeth, where the Supreme Court “held that state common law failure to 
warn claims are not preempted by FDA approval of drug labels[,]”184 or Buckman, where the 
Supreme Court held “that state law fraud-on-the-FDA claims are preempted because they 
conflict with the FDA’s responsibility to police fraud consistently with the Administration’s 
judgment and objectives.”185  When the Sixth Circuit decided Garcia and the Second Circuit 
decided Desiano, the Supreme Court had not yet issued its Wyeth opinion, and therefore, neither 
the Sixth nor Second Circuits were able to consider the Supreme Court’s reasoning that state law 
failure to warn claims were not always federally preempted within the context of brand name 
pharmaceutical labels.
186
 
 The Firth Circuit noted that the claim at issue bore similarities to both the claim considered 
in Buckman and the claim considered in Wyeth.
187
  The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the claim in 
Lofton was similar to the claim asserted in Buckman because fraud-on-the-FDA was required by 
both claims.
188
  The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s claim in Lofton was similar to the claim 
asserted in Wyeth because “the tort covered by the statute is a failure to warn products liability 
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claim,” as was the plaintiff’s claim in Wyeth.189  Yet, the Fifth Circuit noted that, through Wyeth, 
the Supreme Court “preserve[d] common law state tort claims that parallel or reinforce the . . . 
[FDA’s] . . . efforts but do not involve the relationship between the federal regulator and the 
regulated entity.”190  In fact, the relationship between the “federal regulator and the regulated 
entity” was “the dispositive factor for federal preemption in Buckman.”191  The court concluded 
that not applying Buckman to the plaintiff’s claims in Lofton would be “denying that the Texas 
statute is what it is – a requirement to prove fraud on the FDA.”192 
 The Fifth Circuit continued its analysis by noting that in some preemption cases the 
Supreme Court “has occasionally stated that a preemption inquiry starts with the assumption that 
the historic police powers of the states were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that 
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”193  Nevertheless, because the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in PLIVA did not discuss the presumption against preemption, the Fifth Circuit reasoned 
that the “value or relevance a presumption against preemption of state tort law is uncertain.”194   
 Regardless of the effect of the presumption against preemption, the Fifth Circuit asserted 
that “the primacy of the state’s police powers is not universal” and that “the relationship between 
a federal agency and the entity it regulates is inherently federal in character because the 
relationship originates from, is governed by, and terminates according to federal law.”195  
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the Supreme Court’s conclusion that “disclosures to 
the FDA are uniquely federal and thus beyond the states’ traditional police power.”196  The Fifth 
Circuit reasoned that both the plaintiff’s and the Second Circuit’s attempts to distinguish the 
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plaintiff’s claims as traditional state law tort claims, separate and distinct from the federally 
preempted claim considered in Buckman, were unpersuasive because the issue being considered 
by the court was whether the “Texas fraud-on-the-FDA exception to a presumption, is 
preempted.”197  Additionally, while the Supreme Court has held that “the Supremacy Clause to 
permit some parallel state law tort suits, the current case [did not] raise that issue.”198  The Fifth 
Circuit found the plaintiff’s argument - that because proving fraud-on-the-FDA was a “rebuttal 
to a defendant’s affirmative defense” and not an element of the plaintiff’s claim that the statute 
was not federally preempted - unpersuasive.
199
  The Fifth Circuit articulated that “where the 
FDA has not found fraud, the threat of imposing state liability on a drug manufacturer for 
defrauding the FDA intrudes on the competency of the FDA and its relationship with regulated 
entities.”200   
 Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Garcia was more 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s reasoning and holding Buckman than the Second Circuit’s 
reasoning was in Desiano and held “§ 82.007(b)(1) is a fraud-on-the-FDA provision analogous 
to the claim considered in Buckman, . . . [and] it is preempted by the FDCA unless the FDA itself 
finds fraud.”201 
V. ANALYSIS – RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 The circuit split initially created by the Sixth and Second Circuits’ decisions in Garcia and 
Desiano, respectively, and further deepened this year by the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Lofton 
requires resolution.  State statutes constructed similarly to the Texas and Michigan statutes, 
considered at the federal appellate level, should be uniformly interpreted and provide conclusive 
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guidance to state legislatures to allow them to construct statutes that will not be federally 
preempted.  There are three potential resolutions to this circuit split.  First, the split could be 
resolved using the Buckman holding, which would result in the conclusion that state immunity 
exceptions are federally preempted.
202
  Second, the split could be resolved using Justice Steven’s 
concurrence in Buckman, which is the opinion advocated by the Second and Fifth Circuits.
203
  
Under this reasoning, state law immunity exceptions are preempted unless the FDA has itself 
found fraud.  The third solution involves determining that Buckman does not apply to state 
immunity exception statutes because the claims at issue are traditional state law tort claims, and 
therefore, are not federally preempted.  This is the position advocated by the Second Circuit in 
Desiano.
204
 
 Applying the Supreme Court’s rational in Buckman is the best resolution to the circuit split 
because the Michigan and Texas statutes considered by the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits 
require the plaintiff to provide evidence that a drug manufacturer made misrepresentations to the 
FDA, which was a part of the plaintiffs’ federally preempted claims in Buckman.  While the 
Court’s holding in Wyeth indicated that state failure to warn claims are not necessarily federally 
preempted, the particular issues considered by the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits were distinct 
from the question the Court was considering in Wyeth.
205
  These cases involved the use of a state 
statute that implicates the relationship between drug manufacturers and the FDA, and thus, 
should be analyzed and considered based upon the Supreme Court’s holding in Buckman.  
 A. Applying Buckman:  Federal Preemption 
 
 In Buckman, the Supreme Court held that state “fraud-on-the-FDA” claims are impliedly 
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preempted by federal law.
206
  The holding in Buckman should be expanded to federally preempt 
the state statutes at issue in the present circuit split. The portions of statutes at issue in this circuit 
split involve the relationship between the FDA and drug manufacturers.  According to 
Buckman’s rationale, “the relationship between a federal agency and the entity it regulates is 
inherently federal in character.”207  Both the Sixth Circuit and Fifth Circuits noted that MICH. 
COMP. LAWS. § 600.29469(5)(a) and TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.007(b)(1) 
involved a state attempting to regulate the relationship between the FDA and drug 
manufacturers.
208
  In Lofton, the court articulated that the Texas statutory provision at issue “re-
treads the FDA’s administrative ground both to conduct discovery and to persuade a jury.”209  
The court noted that it is important to preserve the FDA’s discretion.210  Using similar rationale 
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland has reasoned that a New Jersey 
statute, similar to the Texas and Michigan statutes considered by the courts of appeals, was 
federally preempted because the statutory language “require[d] a fact finder to make a 
determination under state law that federal law leaves exclusively to the FDA.”211       
 Indeed, the FDA has the necessary expertise and authority to exclusively police fraud by 
the drug manufacturers that it regulates.  The FDA has exclusive authority to initiate 
enforcement proceeding against those drug companies that fail to comply with the FDCA and 
applicable regulations.
212
  The FDA has the authority to respond to a finding of fraud by making 
criminal allegations,
213
 imposing imprisonment or financial penalties,
214
 issuing an injunction,
215
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imposing civil penalties,
216
 and withdrawing abbreviated drug applications.
217
  Additionally, 
private citizens have the ability to file a petition with the FDA, requesting that the agency take 
administrative action regarding any regulated entity.
218
  Although ultimately rejected by the 
FDA, prior to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Lofton, individuals had in fact filed a Citizen’s 
Petition, which alleged that Motrin manufacturers “had withheld information from the FDA” 
related to certain risks of taking the drug.
219
  
 A strict application of the Buckman holding to state law fraud-on-the-FDA statutes is not 
without limitations.  As a result of preempting state statutes, which require plaintiffs to provide 
evidence of a drug manufacturer’s fraud-on-the-FDA, individuals in certain jurisdictions may be 
unable to bring failure to warn claims against drug manufacturers.  States, however, as the 
primary regulators of health and safety could modify state legislation to allow failure to warn 
claims against drug manufacturers, which, based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Wyeth are 
not necessarily federally preempted.
220
  Despite the lack of judicial remedies available to private 
citizens, resolving the split by applying Buckman does preserve the states’ traditional authority to 
regulate matters of health and safety.   
B. Applying Justice Stevens’ Buckman Concurrence: Federal Preemption except where the 
FDA has found fraud  
  
 The second potential solution to resolve the circuit split is to apply Justice Stevens’ 
concurrence in Buckman to state fraud-on-the-FDA statutes.
221
  This solution was supported by 
the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ holdings in Lofton and Garcia, respectively. Under this solution, the 
state fraud-on-the-FDA statutes would be preempted unless the FDA has determined that a drug 
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manufacturer has made a fraudulent misrepresentation to the FDA.
222
  Justice Stevens articulated 
that in situations where “the FDA had determined that the petitioner had committed fraud during 
510(k) process and had then taken the necessary steps to remove the harm-causing product from 
the market” the state law claim at issue would “be grounded in the agency’s explicit actions” and 
“a plaintiff would be able to establish causation without second-guessing the FDA’s 
decisionmaking or overburdening its personnel.”223  In Garcia, the Sixth Circuit held that the 
exceptions to the state statute were preempted except in cases where “claims based on federal 
findings of bribery or fraud on the FDA.”224  Several legal scholars have supported this view.225  
Likewise, in Lofton, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that state law claims are preempted unless the 
FDA has found fraud.
226
  
 In addition to invoking the same concerns raised by resolving the split by strictly applying 
Buckman’s holding, the application of Justice Stevens’ Buckman concurrence creates an 
additional issue.    Neither the Fifth nor the Sixth Circuit’s holdings specifically articulate the 
evidence a plaintiff would need to provide to demonstrate that the FDA had in fact found fraud.  
In Garcia and Lofton, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits attempted to rewrite state health and safety 
legislation rather than interpret such legislation, which is its role within the government.
227
  
Ultimately, state legislatures, if they so chose, should be left to design legislation that would not 
interfere with or attempt to regulate the relationship between drug manufacturers and the FDA, 
but would also provide redress to private citizens seeking to file failure to warn claims against 
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drug manufacturers. 
 C. Applying Desiano:  No Federal Preemption 
 
 The third potential solution to the circuit split is to find that statutes requiring plaintiffs to 
provide evidence that a drug manufacturer made misrepresentations to the FDA are not federally 
preempted.  In its decision in Desiano, the Second Circuit advocated against preemption and for 
a narrow interpretation of Buckman.
228
  The Second Circuit reasoned that  “the presumption 
against preemption should apply to interpreting the Michigan statute because the claim involved 
an area (health/safety) that was traditionally regulated by the states, and the presumption has not 
been overcome.”229  Additionally, the court reasoned that the Michigan statute at issue was 
distinct from the claim considered by the Supreme Court in Buckman because the plaintiff’s 
claim in Desiano was not a “stand-alone” fraud-on-the-FDA claim, but rather, a traditional state 
law tort claim.
230
  Proof of fraud is not an element of the claim in the Michigan statute, like it 
was in the Buckman.
231
 
 The view that Buckman’s holding should be narrowly interpreted and not applied to the 
state law claims at issue in the circuit split has been supported by legal scholars.
232
  Additionally, 
in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Wyeth, where the Supreme Court found that 
federal preemption did not apply to a failure to warn claim involving brand-name 
pharmaceuticals, one such scholar has advocated that the circuit split should be resolved using 
the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Desiano, thus holding that such state statutes are not federally 
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preempted.
233
  Resolving the circuit split in this way is beneficial to plaintiffs because it 
increases the possibility that they will have a successful cause of action against drug 
manufacturers in states where statutory protection has been provided to those manufacturers in 
failure to warn cases.  In Michigan, plaintiffs in failure to warn cases are without private rights of 
action against such drug companies unless Michigan’s fraud-on-the-FDA statute is not federally 
preempted. 
 Resolving the circuit split using the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Desiano would involve a 
number of limitations.  In Buckman, the Supreme Court described a number of practical concerns 
that could arise should plaintiffs have the ability to allege that a drug manufacturer made 
misrepresentations to the FDA.
234
  First, the Court had concerns that drug and medical device 
manufacturers would be overburdened by potential tort liability in each of the fifty states.
235
  
Additionally, manufacturers may be deterred from seeking approval for certain products because 
of the potential for increased liability.
236
  Allowing these types of statutes could result in the 
FDA being inundated with more information than required by its approval processes, which 
would place increased burdens on the agency.
237
  Both the logistical and constitutional concerns 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Buckman are applicable to the state statutes that allow 
plaintiffs to provide, law immunity exceptions at issue regarding the current circuit split.         
VI. CONCLUSION 
 After describing the power of states to experiment with their own individual laws, Justice 
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Brandeis stated that, “[t]his Court has the power to prevent an experiment.”238  In the case of 
state fraud-on-the-FDA statutes, the Supreme Court should do precisely that.  Since the FDA’s 
inception the regulation of health and safety has increasingly been governed by federal statutes 
and regulations.  Nevertheless, the states retain the police power.  In recent history, the Supreme 
Court has resolved a number of conflicts existing between state law and federal drug and medical 
device regulation.  In certain circumstances, the Supreme Court has held that state laws 
regulating drugs and medical devices can coincide with federal laws and regulations doing the 
same.  The circuit split created by Garcia and Desiano, and deepened by Lofton, requires 
resolution by the Supreme Court to solve a source of tension between the states and the federal 
government.  To resolve the split, the Supreme Court’s holding in Buckman should be extended 
to all state laws involving fraud or misrepresentation to the FDA as an element.  Such statutes 
interfere with the authority and expertise of the FDA and should be federally preempted.  This 
resolution preserves the states’ rights to enact laws in health and safety, so long as those laws do 
not interfere with the FDA’s relationship with the drug and medical device manufacturers that it 
has the authority to regulate. 
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